


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
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
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2. Iraq: Anti-Communist military group moves to replace Qasim regime. (Page 1-a)




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4. Brazil: Communist Party will protest Chinese and Cuban support for Communist "deviationists" and non-Communist revolutionaries in Brazil. (Page 3)



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8. Notes: Japan - South Korea;



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*Iraq: An anti-Qasim coup attempt was launched this morning by military elements in Baghdad. Information available as of 0445 EST indicates that fighting is still in progress, but with the odds favoring the new revolutionaries.

Leader of the coup effort is Colonel Abd al-Karim Mustafa. He and most of the other figures identified thus far with the revolt are members of the anti-Communist Baath party.

The Baathists, long opposed to Qasim's pro-Communist policies, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] probably were stimulated into action at this time by the arrests earlier this week of a number of Baath party leaders and by Qasim's recent dismissal of various anti-Communist army officers. Although generally pro-Nasir, the Iraqi Baathists do not favor a union with the UAR.

An announcement over Baghdad Radio, controlled by the revolutionaries, stated that Qasim is dead. This remains unconfirmed, and the announcement may be merely a propaganda play.

Unless the Qasim regime is somehow successful in promptly crushing the revolt, it is likely that the bulk of the army will support the coup. Qasim's prestige among the military has deteriorated steadily for the past several years and Baghdad Radio is claiming receipt of messages of support from a number of military commands. [REDACTED]

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DAILY BRIEF

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*Brazil: The Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) is sending a delegation to Moscow, Prague, and Havana to complain about Chinese and Cuban support of Communist "deviationists" in Brazil and of non-Communist Brazilian revolutionaries.

The party's leader, Luiz Carlos Prestes, reportedly will assure Soviet leaders of the PCB's support of the USSR in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Prestes also intends to protest to Chinese Communist representatives, and to make arrangements for sending two PCB officials to Peiping to lodge a direct complaint.

A number of other Latin American Communist leaders have for some time been similarly angered by Cuban and Chinese Communist support of militant revolutionaries in their countries, to the detriment of the established Communist parties.

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DAILY BRIEF

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NOTES

Japan - South Korea: Prospects for a settlement of outstanding issues between Japan and South Korea have dimmed. Japanese leftists are exploiting public sentiment against the unrepresentative character of the Seoul regime and appear able to organize mass demonstrations against any agreement with South Korea. Seoul, by failing to offer concessions on a fisheries agreement, has made it even more difficult for the Ikeda government to justify a settlement involving Japanese financial aid for Korea.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

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The National Indications Center

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